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The Legal Self-regulation of Religious Groups. Tackling the 
Challenges of Legal Pluralism in Theory and Practice 
Francisco Colom González 
Francisco Colom González is Research Professor at the Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences of 
the National Research Council (CSIC) in Madrid, Spain. His work has mainly dealt with the 
normative relations between culture, political identity and social change. He was the president of the 
Ibero-American Association of Political Philosophy and of the Spanish Association for Canadian 
Studies. Currently he is directing the project Philosophy and the Political Space: A Topological 
Approach to Politics and Democracy. 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on the claims for legal self-regulation made by some religious 
minorities in Western societies. Such claims have often reached the legal system 
of the state, either through arbitration practices, judicial litigation on religious 
marital agreements or personal status laws, and they have also stirred public 
discussion in the political arena. Both circumstances have substantial 
implications for legal and political theory: whereas the interaction of religious 
and civil law has sometimes resulted in legal hybridization, the cultural 
exceptions to the rule of law are a politically sensitive issue. After reviewing 
several experiences with religious arbitration and the ‘interlegality’ resulting 
from the cultural transplant of legal norms, it is maintained that the legitimacy of 
these types of claims can be significantly enhanced by intercultural legal 
hermeneutics and democratic deliberation. These two approaches presuppose a 
dialogical evaluation of the principles guiding social relations. Accordingly, two 
complementary strategies are suggested to tackle the challenges of legal 
pluralism: an intercultural approach to legal interpretation, and the public 
deliberation on the normative purpose lying behind the possible granting of legal 
autonomy to religious groups.  
 
The increasing privatization of the judicial functions of the state has indirectly created a 
new front in the management of intercultural relations, namely the claims for legal self-
regulation posed by some ethnic and religious groups. These claims not only question the 
state monopoly on the production and interpretation of the law, but also compromise the 
formal guarantees that the ‘rule of law’ is conventionally assumed to provide. This formula 
is commonly understood as the requirement that authority should be exercised within a 
framework of public norms (Waldron 2008). This notion of lawful process goes back to the 
English Magna Carta in the Middle Ages, which stated that: 
 
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or 
possessions, or outlawed or exiled. Nor will we proceed with force against 
him, except by the lawful judgement of his equals or by the law of the land. 
To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice. 
 
The historical development of the rule of law runs parallel to the secularization of legal 
validity and the formal rationalization of the law. The normative core of this Anglo-
American notion overlaps with the German doctrine of the Rechtsstaat, which makes the 
legitimate exercise of sovereign power conditional to its subjection to a rational legal 
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structure. Both systems share a common conviction on the unity and uniqueness of legal 
authority, its jurisdictional cohesion and the hierarchical organization of legal norms. This 
view, which has been sometimes described as an ‘ideology of legal centralism’ (Griffiths 
1986) was hegemonic during most of the modern period, and it presupposes the active role 
of the state for the existence of the law. As Klaus Günther has put it:  
 
Most academic as well as political debates about the law are still directed to 
the concept of a national legal order with a centralised and public 
legislation, with a legally bound executive power that is responsible to the 
sovereign people, and with a relatively autonomous judiciary that is 
committed to a coherent adjudication of a legitimate legal system (Günther 
2008: 5).  
 
Pluralist legal doctrines have offered an alternative to this positivistic view. ‘Legal 
pluralism’ can be understood either as an empirical fact or as a stream in critical legal 
theory. In the first sense it simply refers to the inexistence of a unified and homogeneous 
source of legal authority in a given society, be it for the political inability of the state to 
impose it – as is the case in many societies which experienced or resulted from colonialism, 
and where local or customary law coexists with modern state law - or for the organized 
cohabitation of two or more legal systems – as for instance in Canada, where English 
common law and French civil law have been preserved on a territorial basis, or in many 
Muslim countries, where a jurisdictional articulation of Islamic and positive law can be 
found (Dupret 1999). The extent to which heterogeneous legal orders interact and mutually 
recognize each other is a contingent fact that depends on multiple circumstances.  
As a theoretical approach, however, legal pluralism takes a normative stand and 
assumes the parallel and often contradictory types of legitimation underlying legal norms. 
Its basic premise is that the notion of ‘law’ must not be solely confined to state, 
international and transnational law, but it should be enlarged to include normative 
conceptions whose validity is authoritatively asserted within a given social formation (Von 
Benda-Beckmann 2006). If a legal order is considered as nothing but the political and 
juridical systematization of social practices, and justice is not viewed as an abstract code of 
legal statements but what entitles legal practitioners to perform, one would be keener to 
recognize the polycentric character of most legal systems and the uneven scale of their 
normative efficacy. From a pluralist perspective then, state law would be only one among 
other systems of social rules, and it would be permanently pressed to negotiate the validity 
of its own norms, their implementation and their assimilation of other systems (Falk Moore 
1978). 
The relevance of the cultural substratum for the operating of the legal process was 
originally signalled by Eugen Ehrlich at the beginning of the twentieth century. A witness 
to the inextricable diversity of the Habsburg Empire, Ehrlich introduced the concept of 
‘living law’ (lebendes Recht) to criticize the conventional approach of the jurisprudence of 
his time, which limited itself to the written laws laid down in the Austrian legal code, while 
ignoring the legal traditions in which it was embedded. Ehrlich noticed that there was an 
intimate relation between social and legal norms, and that legal obligation was mostly 
induced by settled patterns of behaviour, rather than by an abstract abidance with the law. 
According to him, the law is basically an ‘ordering’ (Ordnung) of human behaviour, so the 
legal interpreter must search for the roots of the present laws in the inner organization of 
human associations. As he tried to show with his research on the legal customs regulating 
marriage and inheritance in his native Bukovina region, beneath state norms there existed a 
customary law that was at least as important, if not more so, than statutory law. This 
unofficial law enjoyed social acceptance, stemmed from continued practice and worked in a 
parallel, but not necessarily opposite way to state law.  
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The rules that, by themselves, people living together consider binding are 
the living law. They constitute a legal order just like those included in the 
legal codes. The difference is that the former become valid by the voluntary 
action of the parties involved, whereas the latter must, to a great extent, be 
enforced by the courts and public authority (Ehrlich, 1986: 233; my 
translation).  
 
After being criticized by Kelsen and the Austrian positivistic school, whose theoretical 
hegemony he could not challenge, Ehrlich’s work fell mostly into oblivion. It was 
rediscovered several decades later by legal anthropologists, who applied some of his 
notions to the study of both primitive and developed societies. This approach instigated an 
ongoing academic debate on the different types of social norms and the interaction between 
coexisting legal systems (Nelken 2009; Pospisil 1971).  
 
 
Religious arbitration in Canada and Great Britain 
 
Globalisation has increased the polycentric character of legal processes. As Klaus Günther 
has observed, with the current proliferation of private and public legal actors 
 
A ‘uniform concept of law’ can no longer be maintained. Instead, legal 
theory has to deal with many different normative systems. The positivist 
concept of ‘one’ legal system that is logically ordered and hierarchically 
differentiated turns into a ‘plurality’ of legal regimes. The fact of ‘legal 
pluralism’ seems to turn the idea of a unified legal system into a mere 
fiction (Günther 2008: 6) 
 
Günther had in mind the role of supranational organisations with de iure or de facto legal 
capacity, but also the normative problems that emerge from fragmented procedures of self-
regulation – like a deficit on the accountability, transparency and legitimacy of the law. On 
the other hand, the decentralization of law-making processes has run in favour of certain 
ethnic and religious groups. There are in most contemporary societies a number of 
communities whose members have chosen to regulate their behaviour in matters of diet, 
family and intra-communitarian issues according to self-imposed standards that 
conspicuously differ from those of mainstream society. Many of these groups have 
attempted to obtain some degree of autonomy and official recognition for their regulative 
practices. The conflict of laws that this has sometimes engendered has several sources: in 
some cases it is a by-product of the right to self-determination granted to aboriginal peoples 
by international conventions; in other cases it is derived from the ‘diasporic legal 
reconstructions’ (Shah 2005) locally impelled by immigrant communities, and more 
generally it results from the rules on personal status recognized by international private law. 
Canada became an early testing ground for the experience of legal pluralism both 
in its ethnic and religious facets. Whereas aboriginal claims to self-rule have their legal and 
historical roots in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and in the treaties signed by the First 
Nations and the Crown, the religious dimension of legal pluralism came out into the open 
more recently, as a result of some practices of communitarian arbitration among 
immigrants. Religious arbitration can be defined as 
 
A voluntary dispute resolution process, conducted according to religious 
principles….  It can refer to processes that are binding, or non-binding; to 
actions that are highly formal, or highly informal; and to processes that are 
intended to serve as a prelude to court action, a partial substitute for court 
action, or a complete substitute (Walter 2012: 503-504) 
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A variety of these types of practices has existed in Canada and the United States since the 
colonial times, but they came to the forefront of the public attention in 2003, when the 
president of the Canadian Society of Muslims, Syed Mumtaz Ali, announced the creation of 
a Sharia arbitration court (the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice) for the Ontario Muslim 
community in order to apply traditional Islamic law in marriage and other private issues. 
This initiative made use of the Ontario Arbitration Act of 1991, which in Section 32.1 
stated that “in deciding a dispute, an arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law 
designated by the parties or, if none are designated, the rules of law it considers 
appropriate in the circumstances”. This Act made all arbitrations within Ontario binding 
and enforceable, except for commercial disputes between international parties. It did not 
explicitly exclude the family law from it and did not mention the requirement that 
judgments should conform to Canadian law, as did the previous provincial arbitration act. 
Under these circumstances, it seemed possible for religious boards to make binding 
decisions on divorce or inheritance cases based on grounds that Canadian courts would not 
necessarily recognize. 
An agitated public debate followed suit, with forty-eight organizations putting 
their names to a declaration denouncing the danger of such an initiative to women’s 
equality rights. The main concern was that religious arbitration might become a judicial 
ghetto for the most vulnerable members of the Muslim community - mainly women who 
had recently migrated into the country - and that it would actually deprive them of the 
possibility of moving out of, and learning to cope with, different social environments (Baqi 
2005; Rahnema, 2006). Contrariwise, the arguments in favour of the initiative stressed the 
convenience of protecting those women who wish to live up to the religious standards of 
their community, and the necessity to regulate a type of practice that already exists in the 
daily lives of many people in immigration societies (Bakht 2007).  
As a reaction to the public concern, the Attorney General of Ontario asked an 
independent legal consultant, Marion Boyd, to conduct a review on the use of arbitration in 
the province. The official report that followed recognised that “Canada is a multicultural 
society, and the fundamental tension that must be addressed is between respect for the 
minority group and protection of a person’s individual rights within that minority” (Boyd 
2004: 3), but it did not exclude the possibility of arbitration by way of religious law in 
family and inheritance cases, provided that the promotion of alternative ways of dispute 
resolution for minority groups was balanced against “a firm commitment to individual 
autonomy”. She therefore recommended a series of additional provisos and procedural 
guarantees to the Arbitration Act. In 2005 the Premier of Ontario, Dalton McGuinty, 
decided nevertheless to veto the initiative and to abrogate all religious arbitration boards in 
the province. The Family Law Amendment Act, enacted one year later, narrowed family 
arbitration in accordance with the law of Ontario and Canadian jurisdiction. 
The defeat of the plan to introduce Islamic arbitration boards in Ontario was 
therefore political, not strictly juridical, and it took place in the political sphere, not in the 
courts, for it could not overcome the local ‘moral panic’ and the prejudices associated with 
the notion of ‘Islamic law’. This initiative actually entailed as many problems as it tried to 
address, for divorce is a mainly federal jurisdiction in Canada, and no mention was made of 
the Islamic legal tradition that would be followed by the arbitration board, nor how its 
decisions would be reconciled with Canadian law.  
A comparable debate ignited in the United Kingdom in 2008, when some 
statements by the Archbishop of Canterbury at the Royal Courts of Justice about “crafting a 
just and constructive relationship between Islamic law and the statutory law of the United 
Kingdom” aroused a political upheaval (Williams 2008). What the Archbishop actually 
mentioned, quoting the work of Ayelet Shachar, an Israeli academic based in Canada, was 
the possibility of recognizing a ‘supplementary jurisdiction’ so that Muslims could freely 
decide to resort to a British court or to religious institutions to settle some of their intra-
communitarian disputes. As the Muslim Council of Great Britain hurried to remark, such 
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possibility would just put British Muslims on the same level as other religious 
communities, like the Jewish, which for centuries have had at their disposal institutions like 
the Batei Din or rabbinic tribunals for arbitrating family matters and interpreting religious 
rules and rituals. Indeed, British Muslims have been using for some time now, informal 
practices of arbitration as an authoritative reference for the resolution of private disputes. 
The peculiarity of the English case is that its common law system, and more concretely the 
Arbitration Act of 1996, does not require that the rules of arbitration belong to English law, 
and it does not preclude that the third party to which the resolution is delegated be a 
religious authority. The only prerequisite is that the parties involved freely and voluntarily 
agree to submit to such jurisdiction and commit to manage the whole procedure in a fair 
and adequate manner. Originally these practices were not recognised as officially binding, 
but since 2007 the British government has sanctioned the operation of several ‘Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunals’ throughout the country. As the Lord Chief Justice of England and 
Wales remarked in a speech at the East London Muslim Centre, 
 
There is no reason why principles of Sharia Law, or any other religious 
code should not be the basis for mediation or other forms of alternative 
dispute resolution. It must be recognized, however, that any sanctions for a 
failure to comply with the agreed terms of the mediation would be drawn 
from the laws of England and Wales. So far as aspects of matrimonial law 
are concerned, there is a limited precedent for English law to recognize 
aspects of religious laws, although when it comes to divorce this can only 
be effected in accordance with the civil law of this country (Lord Philips 
2008: 19) 
 
The public animosity against the very idea of ‘Sharia courts’ dealing with family issues in 
Britain pressed Jack Straw, the Secretary of State for Justice in the Cabinet of Tony Blair, 
to make clear before the British Parliament that arbitration, as a method for dispute 
resolution, could not be applied to family matters. 
 
Arbitration is not a system of dispute resolution that may be used in family 
cases. Therefore no draft consent orders embodying the terms of an 
agreement reached by the use of a Sharia council have been enforced 
within the meaning of the Arbitration Act 1996 in matrimonial proceedings 
(Straw 2008).  
 
The consequences of this debate still loom large in the Bill on Arbitration and Mediation 
Services (Equality Bill, HL Bill 72) currently under consideration at the House of 
Commons, which explicitly excludes criminal and family issues from arbitration. A new 
case, Jivraj v. Hashwani, has more recently put forward the limitations that the public 
function of arbitration imposes on the autonomy of the parties.  
 
 
‘Interlegality’ and the cultural transplant of legal norms 
 
The coexistence of different normative systems within the same political body tends to 
create multiple affiliations, that is, membership in overlapping and potentially conflicting 
sets of jurisdiction. Whether such multiplicity is ignored, rejected or accepted by the 
established legal system is an open political question. One possibility is to recognize a 
given legal body as a collective right of those living under its rule. This would approach it 
to what Will Kymlicka, in his general theory of minority rights, has vaguely characterized 
as ‘polyethnic rights’ (Kymlicka 1995). Another alternative is to incorporate unofficial law 
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into state law through legal or judicial interpretation. Sousa Santos has coined the term 
‘interlegality’ for defining this peculiar phenomenon of interpenetrating legal orders. 
 
We live in a time of porous legality or legal porosity, multiple networks of 
legal orders forcing us to constant transitions and trespassing. Our legal life 
is constituted by the intersection of different legal orders, that is, by 
interlegality. Interlegality is the phenomenological counterpart of legal 
pluralism, and a key concept in a postmodern conception of law (Sousa 
Santos 2002: 437) 
 
Interlegality can indeed be conceived as both a process and an outcome, namely: 
 
As a process of adoption of elements of a dominant legal order, both 
national and international, and of the frames of meaning that constitute 
these orders, into the practices of a local legal order, and/or the other way 
round; or as the outcome of such process, a hybrid new legal order 
(Hoekema 2005: 11) 
 
This notion goes beyond the restricted sense in which Alan Watson first used the term 
‘legal transplant’ decades ago (Watson 1974). Whereas Watson merely meant by this, the 
transfer of a legal rule from one jurisdiction to another, the notion of ‘interlegality’ buys 
into a pluralist conception of the law that takes into account its cultural background. Both 
notions concerning the relocation of norms and the resulting legal hybridization can be 
applied to describe the transferal of private arbitration to the litigation methods of the state 
law system. This is typically the case when disputes on marital contracts, inheritance, 
children custody or commercial agreements within immigrant communities have 
transcended the original boundaries of religious or unofficial law and reached the ordinary 
jurisdiction. State courts then turn into an ‘interface’ for heterogeneous and often 
conflicting legal codes. The termination of Muslim and Jewish marriages, which is ruled by 
contractual principles, has been often involved in such cases. In the Muslim tradition, the 
different procedures conducive to the dissolution of the marital bond entail a dissimilar 
degree of initiative on the part of the wife and the corresponding right to receiving 
compensation from the husband. The reparation incorporated into the marital contract is 
conceived as a means of sustenance for the wife in case of a sudden death of the husband, 
divorce or other emergency situations. In spite of its protective function, this type of 
endowment (Mahr) is not strictly a gift or a gratuity. An early sentence by an English court 
in 1965 interpreted the Mahr as a property right, rather than a lump sum or a marital 
compensation. 
 
This right [to the Mahr] is far more closely to be compared with a right of 
property than a matrimonial right or obligation, and I think that, upon the 
true analysis of it, it is a right ex contractu, which, whilst it can in the 
nature of things only arise in connection with a marriage by Mohammedan 
law (which is ex hypothesi polygamous), is not a matrimonial right. It is not 
a right derived from the marriage but is a right in personam, enforceable by 
the wife or widow against the husband or his heirs (Shahnaz v. Rizwan) 
 
According to this interpretation, the Mahr would be a legal effect of the marital contract to 
which the wife is entitled as her exclusive property. Repudiation (Talaq), on the other hand, 
is a unilateral termination of marriage by the husband without further need to justify his 
decision in a court. However, it implies his obligation to pay the full monetary amount due 
to the wife. Divorce can also be initiated by the wife with the husband’s consent (Khula) 
and the mediation of a religious judge, but usually at the cost of renouncing the Mahr; or it 
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can be done without the husband’s consent (Faskh), provided that the wife can demonstrate 
to the judge that she has suffered some kind of harm during the marriage. In such case the 
wife may still be entitled to receive the payment. Unlike Muslim marriages, whose 
particular arrangements are directly negotiated between the parties, the terms of Jewish 
marriages are fairly standard, and it only ends with the death of one of the spouses or with 
the voluntary and unilateral granting of divorce (Get) by the husband. 
The attempt to have these religious arrangements enforced by state courts has 
created a range of disparate legal resolutions and put forward some of the normative 
problems involved in legal transplant. Following the initial path set by Shahnaz v. Rizwan, 
some judges in the United States and in Canada have resorted to universalistic patterns of 
interpretation, adapting the religious clauses of the marriage agreements to the conventional 
principles of contract law. In such cases the judge limits him/herself to resolve the dispute 
between the parties through an internal rule, without entering to interpret the religious norm 
as such, as in Avitzur v. Avitzur. This case dealt with the refusal of a Jewish husband to 
grant the religious divorce (Get) to his wife, thereby preventing her from remarrying 
according to her religious beliefs. The Court put the Jewish prenuptial agreement (Ketubah) 
on the same level as an ordinary contract, thereby conceiving its terms as enforceable 
obligations, and ordered the husband to appear before the rabbinical board. After two 
appeals by the parties involved, the New York Supreme Court ruled that this was not an 
intrusion of the state in religious matters, because it just required the parties to appear 
before a dispute resolution panel to which they had agreed before marriage, and it did not 
force any particular outcome on the husband.  
In other cases – as in Kaddoura v. Hammoud, which dealt with a counter-petition 
by a Muslim wife and the payment of Mahr – the court assumed a relativistic perspective 
and considered that religious law has inherent properties that prevent civil law from 
interfering with it, lest the civil courts be led into the ‘religious thicket’. According to this 
view, religious obligation should not be considered as an obligation suitable for 
adjudication in the civil courts. It has also been the case that a court has rejected the 
enforceability of the Mahr as contrary to public policy, as In re Marriage of Dajani, where 
the Court of Appeals of California interpreted it as a ‘dowry agreement’ clearly designed 
for the wife to profit from a divorce. The court therefore ruled that a contract encouraging 
marriage dissolution could not be legally enforced. 
Similar experiences of interlegality are less frequent in countries with civil law 
systems. However, European courts have also been pressed to decide on the validity of 
religious arrangements in cases involving private international law and heterogeneous 
personal status. The most recurrent cases have to do with the registration of foreign Muslim 
marriages, with the civil effects of polygamy, with repudiation (Talaq) as a procedure for 
the dissolution of marriage, and with the custody of minors (Kafala). European 
jurisprudence shows some similarities and differences in this field. In countries like France, 
Spain, Italy and Belgium, nationality is the connecting factor for assigning a particular case 
to one legal system. Under this principle, when a norm or institution is permitted by the 
personal status law of both spouses - even if it has no legal standing in the host country - it 
may have some legal effects on issues like family reunification, inheritance rights, alimony 
and widow’s pension. In France, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium the courts also keep 
the standard that declares foreign law applicable in principle, but without authorising the 
actual application of those rules considered discriminatory in a particular situation. On the 
whole though, the result of this case-by-case procedure is quite uncertain, as it depends on 
the judge’s conviction, and it therefore renders a very insecure and divided jurisprudence 
on these matters (Foblets 2003). 
When it comes to the theoretical approach for legal interpretation in cases of 
conflict of laws, some authors have proposed that a search be made for a legal meta-
language or for a universal code of legality “which contains basic legal concepts and rules, 
like the concept of rights and of fair procedures, and the concepts of sanction and 
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competence” (Günther 2008: 16). Although Günther’s view is far from a natural law 
approach, it is, in its own way, compatible with Lon Fuller’s well-known notion of the 
‘principles of legality’ that every system of law, properly understood, must meet (Fuller 
1964). Other authors have instead advocated for the articulation of interlegality through the 
recognition of ‘normative compatibilities’ (Amstutz 2005) or by adopting a ‘functionalist 
approach’. This last one has been standard procedure in international private law, where the 
judge searches in the foreign rules for similar functions to the law of the land. When in 
doing this he finds an incompatibility with the fundamental principles of the domestic legal 
system, foreign law is usually set aside invoking the ‘public order exception’ as a reason. 
However, legal format need not be systematically privileged over cultural context. Some 
authors have seen here a chance for a non-hegemonic recognition of legal norms that are 
culturally alien. In the particular case of the Mahr,  
  
This functional approach has the advantage of taking an internal vantage 
point on cultural practices and investigating their contours, rather than 
focusing on their difference and lack of familiarity. [For instance] a judge 
could look behind the religious nature of the Mahr to ask what its purpose 
is in a marriage, and what values, such as trust, respect, and financial 
independence are promoted by its enforcement (Fournier 2010: 70-71) 
 
This functionalist approach enjoyed considerable acceptance in the 1980’s, but since then 
the trend in Europe has reversed toward a more systematic refusal of recognizing any 
legally dissonant effect of marriages contracted abroad. In general terms then, the 
predisposition of the ordinary courts to enforce religious legal agreements has depended on 
their consideration from a purely civil perspective, but this has not prevented them from 
being culturally misinterpreted. For instance, some authors have denounced the translation 
of Islamic marital arrangements as if they were prenuptial agreements as producing a 
‘denaturation’
1
 of the original legal institution. As the case of the Mahr would illustrate, 
this has resulted in the diminishing or even in the denying of the contractual capacity of the 
bride (Fournier 2010; Wolfe 2006; Qaisi 2001-2). But the opposite can also be true. In 
cases like the custody of minors, the principle of the child’s best interest has sometimes led 
to more generous interpretations by the courts than the original Muslim institution (Kafala) 
which, unlike adoption, does not create any bond of filiation.
2
 It is therefore difficult to 
conclude whether legal transplant has inherent emancipatory or alienating consequences. Its 
practical results depend on the insertion of such practice within a wider social and political 
context. 
 
 
The public sphere and the rule of law 
 
Pluralist approaches probably reflect the social dynamics of the legal process more 
accurately than positivism does, but they offer no clues for the normative coordination of 
heterogeneous or conflicting legal orders. Legal pluralism grapples indeed with an 
inescapable tension between three main normative references: state sovereignty, the 
                                                 
1 In anthropology, the French term dénaturation refers to the loss by a legal system of the characteristics that 
define its specificity against other systems, that is, the change of its fundamental logic so that “the legal system is 
dispossessed of what constitutes its identity, leaving the population with rules and habits that are in the process of 
losing their meaning” (Bé-Nkogho Bé 2006). 
2 For instance, when dealing with the right to orphan’s pension of two Moroccan children living in Spain, the High 
Court of Andalusia came to recognize the ‘correspondence effects’ and the ‘functional similarity’ between Kafala 
and adoption, putting both institutions on the same practical level (Sentencia del Tribunal Superior de Justicia de 
Andalucía de 14-09-2004; rec. 1014/2003; Quiñones Escámez 2009). 
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recognition of minority groups and the rights of the individuals. The implementation of 
legal jurisdictions on ethnic or religious grounds - particularly if they are endowed with the 
right to self-regulation - runs against the liberal perception of the public sphere as a testing 
ground for the reasonability of public demands. This is why even if there may be good 
reasons for granting this type of legal autonomy, there are also solid arguments for 
deterrence.  
Self-regulation is most often claimed by groups that are driven by their traditional 
nomos or coded cultural habits (Cover 1983) in order to ensure their social survival and the 
reproduction of their identity. Such groups tend to impose a subordinate role on women, 
who as biological reproducers of the group usually bear a disproportionate share in the task 
of transmitting tradition. The implementation of a system of legal compartments thus 
fosters the risk of entrenching discrimination against the most vulnerable members of the 
group, depriving them of the institutional frame that in liberal polities protects the rights of 
the individuals. Some authors maintain that the interaction of ‘external protections’ and 
‘internal restrictions’ may outplay the concentration of normative authority typical of 
traditionalist communities (Shachar 2001, Kymlicka 1995). The joint governance of 
different sources of authority should thus increase the competition between individual 
affiliations and press for the transformative accommodation of the group. However, this 
view underestimates the conservative kernel of the communities that typically plea for these 
types of arrangements and that are by definition hostile to change.  
A strong version of legal pluralism, for example one that recognizes the exclusive 
jurisdiction of religious or ethnic boards, would imply the renunciation of state sovereignty 
upon a whole segment of society and the legal protection that the rule of law provides. Such 
formula does not merely protect cultural difference but entrenches legal differentiation by 
multiplying the sources of legal authority. In their extreme or illiberal version, multicultural 
jurisdictions tend to segment the demos on ascribed grounds and contradict the principle of 
publicity and deliberative justification that has traditionally inspired the very notion of the 
rule of law (Waldron 2008). Arrangements of this type were not uncommon before the 
emergence of the national state, like the millet system in the Ottoman Empire, the self-
governing aljamas of Moors and Jews in the medieval kingdoms in Spain or the repúblicas 
de indios in colonial Spanish America.  
Modern states have been traditionally hostile to accept this type of legal diversity, 
since it runs against their egalitarian and homogenizing ethos. The cultural and legal 
uniformity promoted by the national state was supposed to facilitate social communication 
and help develop the political judgment of free and equal citizens. Monolingualism and 
secularisation were not only perceived as the standard path to be followed by modern 
societies, but as a structural prerequisite for a successful democratic process. In its liberal 
version, the public sphere was closely associated to what John Stuart Mill termed the 
‘common sympathies’ necessary for creating a national community. This type of social 
affinity was mainly fostered by shared language and recollections.  
 
Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different 
nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they 
read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to 
the working of representative government, cannot exist. The influences 
which form opinions and decide political acts are different in the different 
sections of the country… The same books, newspapers, pamphlets, 
speeches, do not reach them. One section does not know what opinions, or 
what instigations, are circulating in another. The same incidents, the same 
acts, the same system of government, affect them in different ways (Mill 
1861: 289) 
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Contemporary societies are far more complex than those that first witnessed the emergence 
of the liberal public sphere. Ethnically heterogeneous polities are not something new in 
history. What is new is their political combination with egalitarianism and democracy. In 
any case, the modern global dynamics has made them an inescapable phenomenon. In this 
context, the naïve universalism envisioned by the European Enlightenment has been met by 
many discourses that advocate some type of moral particularism for the sake of social 
fairness and as compensation for past abuses. Aboriginal movements, for instance, have 
regularly denounced the compulsory processes of acculturation to which their peoples were 
submitted - like the residential schools of the ‘lost generation’ in Canada and Australia - 
and whose legitimation relied on the alleged benefits that membership to a national society, 
the privatization of common land, and the acquisition of citizenship rights were to bring to 
them. These processes, as is well known, very often have resulted in the disintegration of 
native communities and in multiple forms of marginalization. 
In normative terms, the implementation of ethnic or religious jurisdictions - like 
multicultural arrangements in general – needs an explanation for why the relationship 
between individuals and cultures is not something contingent or fortuitous. In the past, 
romantic ideas and nationalistic ideologies resorted to ontological and essentialist 
conceptions for doing this, but such views have lost much of their theoretical clout and 
moral respectability. In my opinion, a more plausible alternative consists in focusing on the 
regulative function of normative systems and their connection with social competence. It 
has been argued that social competence presupposes a familiarity with the symbols, norms 
and values that define the boundaries of social agency (Kymlicka 1989). Individuals 
develop their moral judgment, self-esteem and personal identity by exercising their social 
capabilities within a network of shared cultural meanings. This is illustrated by regulative 
practices, which ultimately depend on the compliance of the individuals involved in them; 
but consensus is a limited social resource. Legal orders need to develop mechanisms for 
shaping some collective standards against the background of normative disagreement 
(Webber 2009). In particular, they must be able to provide regulative responses to 
situations concerning distributive justice or moral redress. The effectiveness of a scheme of 
justice depends on a set of ‘common understandings’ (Walzer 1983) without which the 
adjudication of goods is unintelligible or will be perceived as arbitrary by their recipients. It 
is altogether practical evidence that the attempts to apply principles of justice that are alien 
to the lifeworld in which they must operate turn them sterile and unable to perform the 
regulative functions that are expected from them. The functional complementation between 
regulative practices, cultural meanings and moral competence indirectly raises the 
possibility of finding cross-cultural normative equivalences. This can work as an 
encouragement for the analogical interpretation of legal principles and moral goods, and 
more generally as a plea for a culturally nuanced hermeneutics of the law (Colom González 
2013).  
Intercultural hermeneutics is a task for which moral constructivism and legal 
positivism are not well suited. Both standpoints resist considering social practices and ways 
of life as a source of normative authority. They also share a common conviction on the 
hierarchical character of the legal system, either by conceiving it as a qualitative ranking of 
possible consensus – from a higher ‘constitutional consensus’ down to a mere modus 
vivendi (Rawls 1993) – by presupposing a ‘basic norm’ underneath the system (Kelsen 
2005), or by distinguishing between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ rules (Hart 1961). From a 
positivist perspective, a custom can only become ‘law’ if it can be traced back to a basic 
norm or to a rule of recognition about its origin and formation. Conversely, an analogical 
approach to legal hermeneutics presupposes a situated understanding of the law (Beuchot 
2005). Such methodology should discern the different meanings that a norm may have in its 
original context and the multiple purposes it may serve. The cultural transplant of a norm 
can indeed convey a new meaning to it, and the judge must be aware of its consequences 
when adjudicating an intercultural situation. But there is a political side to this process too. 
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Since Habermas’ early work on the history of the ‘public sphere’ (Habermas 1969) this idea 
and its connection with social agency have fed a sustained debate in political philosophy. 
The public sphere is a normative notion that links political rationality to public deliberation. 
The Habermasian notion of ‘publicity’ (Öffentlichkeit) has been submitted to subsequent 
critique by Marxist, feminist, post-modern and more recently, multicultural detractors 
(Dahlberg 2005). The core of these critiques maintains that Habermas’ utterly rationalistic 
conception of social communication and agency excludes certain groups and issues from 
the public domain, detaches deliberation from power relations, and it is altogether driven by 
a consensualistic bias. Other views have been less critical, merely classifying his notion as 
one of the possible ways of understanding the public sphere, i.e. as the closest to a 
discursive or deliberative theory of democracy (Marx Ferree 2002).  
I will maintain that exceptions to the rule of law for cultural reasons - like minority 
claims for legal self-regulation - are politically dependent on the deliberative rationalization 
of their normative purpose in an open space of political communication. The ethno-
religious segmentation of a legal system does not actually rest on a compensatory or 
restorative conception of justice, as is usually the case of ‘reasonable accommodations’, 
which suspend or adapt a norm in order to obtain a compensatory effect. It is the contingent 
outcome of political decisions concerning the internal configuration of the polity, and like 
any asymmetrical arrangement it requires a strong degree of public acquiescence. The role 
of public deliberation is not really different here from other cases where cultural immunities 
need to be politically legitimated, but from a dialogical conception of democracy the idea of 
public reasoning as a social mediator provides an additional normative support. In our 
context, ‘reasonableness’ can be understood in its basic Rawlsian sense, as a moral 
predisposition to engage in fair cooperation. In political terms though, it means that all the 
norms striving for an enforceable status in a liberal society should be capable of 
justification through the public use of reason. Whereas reasonableness implies the idea of a 
certain dialogical reciprocity, rationality is related to adopting the most effective means to 
ends. Rawls does not try to derive the ‘reasonable’ from the ‘rational’. He presents both as 
complementary ideas working in tandem and as connected to distinct moral powers, namely 
to the capacity for a sense of justice in the first case, and for a conception of the good in the 
second. This is why any scheme of fair cooperation must be necessarily based on both 
principles. 
 
Merely reasonable agents would have no ends of their own they wanted to 
advance by fair cooperation; merely rational agents lack a sense of justice 
and fail to recognize the independent validity of the claims of others (Rawls 
1993: 52) 
 
A further difference between both principles is that reasonableness has a public dimension 
that the rational lacks. 
 
It is by the reasonable that we enter as equals the public world of others and 
stand ready to propose, or to accept, as the case may be, fair terms of 
cooperation with them. These terms, set out as principles, specify the 
reasons we are to share and publicly recognize before one another as 
grounding our social relations. Insofar as we are reasonable, we are ready 
to work out the framework for the public social world (Rawls 1993: 53) 
  
Within this scheme, the lack of reciprocity would turn the attempts to cooperate with others 
on reasonable principles into an ‘irrational’ or ‘self-sacrificial’ act. Reasonable cooperation 
might then be suspended, leaving the strategic approach to social agency alone. It is the 
reciprocity contained in the idea of reasonableness that gives us the key to a deliberative 
interpretation of the democratic process. According to this, cultural immunities should test 
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their political feasibility in an open space of reasonable deliberation, i.e. through a public 
exchange of mutually comprehensible arguments. This postulate does not really demand a 
‘filter of rationality’ for the propositions admitted to the forum. In a liberal public sphere, 
the traditionalist worldviews or illiberal doctrines are not per se excluded from public 
discussion. Even if a set of norms is claimed to have a religious or customary origin, this 
should not be an obstacle for entering into a deliberation about the jurisdictional 
organization of the political community. However, in order to qualify them as ‘law’ – that 
is, as norms enforceable by public authority – the arguments sustaining such claims should 
be fashioned so as to engage in reasonable argumentation. Those norms should thus be 
formally defended as if they were amenable to human interpretation and change. On the 
other hand, prima facie universalistic arguments should face an opposite test of legitimacy, 
namely showing that they can adapt to changing social circumstances and can accept moral 
interpellations from different cultural backgrounds. 
The deliberative component of the democratic process does certainly not suffice by 
itself to settle the legitimation ground for such complex political arrangements. There are 
doubtlessly other historical and social circumstances that must be accounted for in each 
context. After all, legal procedures are but an expression of the existing regulatory practices 
in a given society. They are not traditions that can be invented out of the blue or the 
imaginary product of attributed identities. The communitarian justice practiced by some 
native peoples, or the Islamic law with its developed jurisprudential schools, are deeply 
rooted in their social environment and count on distinct historical and political credentials. 
It is mainly when their norms are transplanted or applied in circumstances different from 
the original that they loose their authoritative aura and find themselves in need of a 
contextual justification. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Trans-cultural diffusion is a pervasive historical phenomenon from which the law has not 
been spared. Many changes in legal systems occur indeed as the result of borrowing, but as 
in any process of translation - traduttore, traditore - the original meanings often get lost. A 
different matter is the social hegemony under which such transferences take place. As we 
have seen, the processes of interlegality do not necessarily function in a unidirectional way. 
There are significant examples of state systems attempting to ‘read’ aboriginal customary 
law and of traditionalist groups trying to adopt egalitarian ideas. In any case, the norms 
involved in pluralist arrangements are not intended for generalization, since they are usually 
attached to a minority status. In order to gain political plausibility and to fight potential 
prejudice, their normative purpose should have the chance to be explained and submitted to 
public scrutiny and opinion. This is both a cognitive and a normative postulate: the debate 
on legal pluralism needs to deal with the morals involved in the cultural narratives of the 
groups claiming for such arrangements in a public way; on the other hand, the 
interpretation of legal norms should not be constricted to a single cultural perspective.  
Both dimensions are complementary, since an intercultural approach to legal 
hermeneutics may illuminate the public discussion on minority claims. Reasonable 
deliberation functions here as a link between the political and the juridical spheres. Both 
practices presuppose a dialogical evaluation of the normative principles guiding our social 
relations. The type of argumentation practiced by legal hermeneutics is certainly different 
from the public discourse used in political communication, but it is not completely detached 
from it. It likewise needs to face peer review and to take into account the public opinion as 
an ultimate test of its reasonableness. After all, the ordre public or ‘public policy’ doctrine 
used in international private law, refers to the social values that underpin the functioning of 
a legal system and bind a society together. When adjudicating a conflict of laws, a judge 
must evaluate the consistency of the foreign norms with the principles sustaining the 
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national law, a task that cannot be undertaken without some degree of cultural 
interpretation and social authorization. Public deliberation and adroit legal hermeneutics 
thus appear as converging strategies for debating the accommodation of legal pluralism in 
democratic societies. They jointly offer a political and a jurisprudential ground so that 
different types of groups may have the chance to defend, translate or adapt the meaning of 
their most cherished moral goods while avoiding essentialist interpretations of their own 
tradition. The actual result of this process and the degree of consensus it may achieve are, 
however, an open question necessarily subjected to the contingencies of political life. 
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